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This Article focuses on battles around legal education reform, which have long
played a strategic role in competing law and development efforts around the world.
There are numerous books and articles now emerging to discuss what global law
schools should be, what kind of teaching and clinical programs make for best
practices, the quality of academic research, and the possibilities of access into the legal
profession. 1 The specific institutional focus of the studies—on categories such as the
bar, the solicitors branch, faculties of law and law schools, judges, or even the “legal
complex”—tends to neglect processes of capital conversion that characterize the law
and lawyers in different settings. The categories must be deconstructed to see what
goes into the law and the legal profession. One way to see processes of transformation
and capital conversion is to draw on interconnected histories that reveal similarities
and differences.

* Yves Dezalay is Director emeritus, CNRS (French National Center for Scientific Research). Bryant
Garth is Chancellor’s Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1.
For examples of edited volumes, see LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Christopher Gane & Robin Hui Huang eds., 2016); THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION (Christophe Jamin & William van Caenegem eds.,
2016).
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Our book project, from which this Article comes, focuses on three dimensions
of a “legal revolution” in the sense employed by Harold Berman in his famous books
on law and revolution. 2 Berman began with explanations of the Gregorian revolution
in the tenth century and then applied the same analysis to the Protestant Reformation.
In each case, he highlighted how learned capital of relatively marginal scholarly groups
linked to emerging political movements and ultimately provided legitimacy and
continuity for the new regime. The new law retained a connection to the established
powers but also took on the new forms of capital made valuable through the state and
social transformation/revolution. Legal education and learned law are thus important
battlegrounds in legal revolutions.
The first dimension of the recent revolution which we focus on is a new imperial
or hegemonic relationship, gaining power with respect to the older colonial
relationships. It involves the ascendency of the United States globally after World War
II and especially the end of the Cold War. With that ascendency came a revolution in
the governance of the state and economy that diffused broadly throughout the world. 3
The global rise of large corporate law firms is one key legal component of this
revolution, which also includes deregulation and privatization. 4
The second dimension is therefore the rise of what is often called the
“financialization” of the economy, the neoliberal revolution, or the Big Bang of
deregulation. One aspect of this transformation is a stagnation and relative
impoverishment of the stock of public capital (which comprised state-owned
companies, banks, and much less debt in the three decades after World War II) versus
a huge accumulation of private capital associated with the so-called “one percent” (or
more accurately one tenth of one percent) and a corresponding accumulation of
government debt.5 The public and private fortunes are reversed.
The third dimension is a transformation seen in legal education and the legal
profession. In one sense, there is a huge proliferation of law schools in many countries
of the world, including the United States to some extent with about 200 law schools;
Mexico,6 Brazil, 7 and India, 8 each of which has more than 1,000 faculties of law; and

2.
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003).
3.
For a more detailed discussion of the diffusion of U.S.-style economics and law, see YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002).
4.
The spread of corporate law firms is the focus of the Project on Globalization Lawyers
and Emerging Economies (“GLEE”) at Harvard Law School’s Center for the Legal Profession. See
THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF THE
CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY (Luciana Gross Cunha et
al. eds., 2018); THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF
THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY (David B. Wilkins et
al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION].
5.
See Thomas Piketty, Public Capital, Private Capital, LE MONDE: LE BLOG DE THOMAS
PIKETTY (Mar. 14, 2017), http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2017/03/14/public-capital-private-capital/.
6.
See Luis Fernando Peғrez Hurtado, Content, Structure, and Growth of Mexican Legal Education,
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China, with some 600 law schools.9 The legal professions of places such as Japan, 10
Korea,11 and Hong Kong 12 have also grown substantially even if relatively small
compared to the others. From one perspective, the proliferation suggests a growing
openness to the legal profession and an increase in the importance of law in state
governance. Yet the story also parallels the story of financialization. There is a vast
difference between the very few institutions at the top and the numerous institutions
at the bottom.
Many of the elite public schools are relatively open on the basis of meritocratic
criteria, but it is extremely difficult to get into them unless one comes from a family
able to put resources into costly primary and secondary schools. 13 And the tuitions
and fees are going up for many of the public schools which compete with a new
cohort of private schools that have entered the markets with the aim largely of
producing corporate lawyers.14 In any event, the differences between the elite and
rank-and-file are dramatic.
In the United States, for example, law professors at elite schools make triple the
salaries of those at low ranked schools, and law graduates able to obtain corporate law
jobs start their careers at more than double the salaries of those who start in the
government or in small firms, with the gap increasing over time.15 The percentage of
law graduates starting at corporate law firms of more than 250 lawyers, according to
the After the JD (AJD) longitudinal study of law graduates who commenced their
careers in 2000, was about 18 percent at a time of a good market in the United States,
and the percentage remaining in such firms at year thirteen was about 8 percent (and
there are also substantial differences between the firms that have more than 250
lawyers).16 The elite equity partners at the US firms come disproportionately from elite
schools. There are therefore “magic circles” in law firms and in law schools that

59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 567, 584 (2010) (referring to more than 1,000 law schools).
7.
See Oscar Vilhena Vieira & José Garcez Ghirardi, The Unstoppable Force, the Immovable Object:
Challenges for Structuring a Cosmopolitan Legal Education in Brazil, 3 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L &
COMP. L. 119, 119-142 (2018)(referring to more than 1,300 law schools).
8.
See Jonathan Gingerich & Nick Robinson, Responding to the Market: The Impact of the Rise of
Corporate Law Firms on Elite Legal Education in India, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4,
at 519, 521 (referring to more than 1390 law schools).
9.
See Zhizhou Wang et al., Internationalizing Chinese Legal Education in the Early Twenty-First
Century, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 237, 237 (2017).
10. See Dan Rosen, Japan’s Law School System: The Sorrow and the Pity, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 267,
288 (2017).
11. Jae-Hyup Lee, Legal Education in Korea: Some Thoughts on Linking the Past and the Future, 44
KYUNG HEE L. REV. 605, 610 (2009).
12. Carol Jones, Producing the Producers: Legal Education in Hong Kong’ in LEGAL EDUCATION
IN ASIA (S. Steele & K. Taylor eds., 2009).
13. Text and notes 43-48 infra.
14. Text and notes 43-48 infra.
15. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY
OF LEGAL CAREERS 41–44 (2004).
16. See Ronit Dinovitzer, Practice Setting, in AFTER THE JD III: T HIRD RESULTS FROM A
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 26, 26 (2014).
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disproportionately reap the profits of business law (and also public interest law). The
key lawyers arguing in the supreme court and taking major positions in government
come from the same elite circles.17
We do not have specific comparable data on other countries, but the differences
are certainly as great given the gaps between the leading law schools and a mass of
marginal schools. Further, the numbers of those who work in the so-called corporate
hemisphere are relatively smaller, and the opportunity to gain access to the large
corporate law firms from non-English speaking countries depends also on knowledge
of English, which relates also to one’s social position and ability to travel. There are
strong social, financial, and cultural barriers to entry into these internationally-oriented
corporate law firms and even to the faculties of law that train their recruits.
The legal revolution that goes with the revolution in governance, involving law
schools, faculties of law, and corporate law firms, can be seen more specifically as part
of a contested process—with legal education as a key battleground. There are both
entrenched and even embattled elites resisting the forces promoting change as well as
elites using multiple positions and connections to absorb and solidify the changes. In
many situations, the process of change is exacerbated by what can be seen as a relative
decline in the value of scholarly capital in comparison to family and social capital. The
decline makes it easier for new groups to ally with emerging but marginal scholarly
communities bringing new investment in scholarship. The new system supported by
the reformers is more embedded in finance and markets, and more academically
selective about who obtains the key positions. It represents a key tool in reconfiguring
academia and in the relation between academia and practice in different countries. The
local battles about law and legal education then depend on a mix of professional and
social hierarchies and relationships to hegemonic powers.
South and East Asia provide a nice setting for exploring these processes. Indeed,
we focus on Asia in the larger project because it is at the core of the revolution that we
wish to analyze. It combines colonial legacies embedded in powerfully entrenched and
homogeneous legal hierarchies and institutions—notably the grand advocates in India,
the Judicial Research and Training Institute in Korea (“JRTI”), and the Legal Research
and Training Institute (“LRTI”) in Japan. More generally, in four of the five countries
we focus on in the larger work, which includes Hong Kong and China as well, there is
a traditional alliance between an elite bar and high judges, with academics in a largely
subordinate position. There is a rise of newcomers (outsiders) both in international
law firms and in local clones of US corporate law firms, building on a powerful mix of
outside resources (including global finance, Ivy League campuses, and legacies of Cold
War hegemony).
These new sites for the reproduction of producers and diffusion/importation of
new forms of financial/legal excellence complement each other in the relative success

17. Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS: REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Dec. 8, 2014,
10:30 A.M.), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/.
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of this offensive. The two camps and their resources are relatively well defined, but the
outcome of these battles differs depending on their respective strengths in each
setting. And apart from Japan, 18 it seems that the old guard is mainly fighting a rearguard battle which aims at delaying and restricting the entry to the inner core hierarchy
of judicial institutions while also slowing the rise of the newcomers. In each case, in
addition, defensive strategies risk backfiring and promoting a diaspora of ambitious
and well-connected law graduates. The case study of India provides a particularly vivid
illustration of such battles.
The general theoretical framework of this Article and the book project which
will follow sees law as a cultural bank holding symbolic capital. This phenomenon is
easy to see in India. The power and history of the Parsi and the Brahmins are
embedded within Indian law as family capital.19 The connections to the state here as
elsewhere are also part of the value of legal capital, as are connections to the leading
family businesses and landowning families. Family capital can be converted into other
forms of capital that become more important at particular times and in particular
places, such as moving from law into economics and land into finance. Law and the
institutions in the legal field provide places of exchange for capital conversion. The
hierarchies within the field also determine receptivity to new forms of capital including
both learned capital and family capital. The elite of the bench and bar in India are at
the top of the profession and guard the temple of Indian law. 20 In the United States, in
contrast, corporate lawyers are in the dominant role. Other countries have different
hierarchies.
From the beginning of law and development in the 1950s, the US approach has
been to challenge the existing guardians of the temple outside the United States in
order to promote universals consistent with US hegemony. US foundations and others
have sought to “modernize” legal elites to become moderate leaders in development
and governance instead of conservative backers of a propertied class seen as enemies
of reform development. The stories of legal education reform are therefore
combinations of export efforts and import efforts that may disagree in many
respects—but unite in seeking to disrupt the existing hierarchies and upgrade the
quality of legal argument and legal scholarship. 21

18.
19.

See Rosen, supra note 10, at 271–72.
See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE
SHADOW OF EMPIRE 66–75 (2010); MITRA SHARAFI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN COLONIAL SOUTH
ASIA: PARSI LEGAL CULTURE, 1772–1947, at 6–7 (2014).
20. See Marc Galanter & Nick Robinson, Grand Advocates: The Traditional Elite Lawyers, in THE
INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 455–85.
21. On India, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, From the ALI to the ILI: The Efforts to Export an American
Legal Institution, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1293 (2005) [hereinafter, Krishnan, From the ALI
to the ILI]; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation,
and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 448 (2004) [hereinafter
Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi]. On Brazil, see JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM:
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 13, 17 (1980); Vieira and Ghirardi,
supra note 7.
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INDIA: COLONIAL PATH DEPENDENCIES REVISITED: AN EMBATTLED SENIOR BAR,
THE MARGINALIZATION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, AND INTERNATIONALIZED
CHALLENGERS

Recent accounts of the Indian legal profession note the powerful position of the
grand advocates, an elite of high court and supreme court barristers who operate in
tandem with the elite judiciary. Galanter and Robinson note that India’s grand
advocates are an “elite handful of lawyers” that have “flourished in the age of
globalization.” 22 Wilkins and Khanna note the perception among in-house counsel
that “a small number of Grand Advocates . . . dominate the Indian advocacy
market”—essential especially “when the stakes were high.”23 Ballakrishnen’s recent
report on India notes that the story of the bar is one of continuity, with familial capital
remaining important and limiting entry to the flourishing elite barrister practices.24 The
corporate law firms, Ballakrishnen also finds, have changed. They broke somewhat
with their historical path and became relatively meritocratic without the overt gender
bias dominant in the bar. 25
The bar appears therefore to be an example of highly restricted entry—control
over the market—among a relatively small group for which family capital is critical to
get access to a pupillage. The top advocates reap substantial monopoly profits. The
corporate bar, except for the leaders and dominant partners of the top firms, 26 does
not do quite as well, but it too is relatively prosperous compared to those who make
up the rank-and-file of the profession. And in contrast to the advocates in the bar, the
corporate firms hire on relatively meritocratic grounds. In particular, they provide
lucrative jobs for those who graduate from the relatively new and meritocratic national
law schools.27
The scholarly accounts described above each emphasize one aspect of the
current situation, highlighting the contrast between the two sectors —the bar and the
corporate law firms. Our account relates the two accounts and emphasizes also that
the Indian legal aristocracy was built through colonialism and has always existed in a
peripheral, dominated relationship. The Indian legal aristocracy has tended to be quite
conservative except in relation to support for the independence movement. The great
wealth of the “Nabobs of the law” prior to independence and during the golden age of
the bar after independence depended on connections to the British legal core and on
22. Galanter & Robinson, supra note 20, at 455.
23. David B. Wilkins & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Globalization and the Rise of the In-House Counsel
Movement in India, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 114, 146.
24. See S.S. Ballakrishnen, Present and Future: A Revised Sociological Portrait of the Indian Legal
Profession, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY PROJECT 1, 16–17 (2017).
25. Id.
26. Interview No. 1 (Email) (July 2017).
27. See Jonathan Gingerich & Nick Robinson, Responding to the Market: The Impact of the Rise of
Corporate Law Firms on Elite Legal Education in India, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4,
at 519, 519–47.
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service on behalf of large landholders. 28 The conservatism of the legal elite led Nehru
to accuse the bench and bar of engineering a “purloined state” characterized by attacks
in the courts on Nehru’s progressive policies in the 1950s and 1960s.29 The elite of the
bar, with a few exceptions, resisted policies that would reduce the power of their
traditional clients.
The bunker mentality adopted by the traditional legal elite, protecting itself and
its market, helped to depreciate the prestige of law and legal careers. As was well
documented in the 1960s and 1970s, law was not the choice of talented individuals
without strong family contacts in the legal profession, despite efforts of the Ford
Foundation and others to find a point of entry to improve teaching and scholarly
research as a way to modernize the profession. 30 The best students chose engineering
or medicine rather than law, with the Indian Institutes of Technology providing a welldocumented point of entry for those able to excel on the entrance examinations.
Criticisms of the conservatism of the legal profession opened up possibilities for
new ideas and contacts seeking to adapt to and ally with new local and global
governing hierarchies. In particular, as discussed more below, entrepreneurs in law
took advantage of a hegemonic restructuring that increased the relative value of U.S.
made-and-exported legal expertise. The period after the emergency declared by Indira
Gandhi in the mid-1970s was a key period for this entrepreneurship.
The support of the Indian Supreme Court for the emergency gave rise to a larger
reformist element among the legal elite, and that opposition provided an opportunity
to regain the bar’s stature. Led by entrepreneurial activists in the bench and bar, the
Supreme Court itself and the senior bar improved their image with the development
of public interest litigation with some assistance from the Ford Foundation. 31 The
timing also made more salient the existing momentum for reform of legal education
centered at the University of Delhi. In particular, the idea of a new national law school
outside of the existing law faculties gained support from Upendra Baxi’s critique and
suggestions for reform, published later. 32 It also drew on the successes of the Indian
institutes of technology and the Indian institutes of management, themselves in part
inspired by US higher education.
Baxi, the best known Indian legal academic, obtained an SJD from the
University of California, Berkeley, taught in Australia, and then came back to the
University of Delhi. He taught from the 1970s to mid-1990s there, served as dean and
in many other capacities, and moved to the University of Warwick in the mid-1990s.
His career is closely connected to the rise of public interest litigation and the
development of the national law schools. The following quote taken from a recently

28. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 151–57.
29. Id.
30.
Id.; see also Krishnan, From the ALI to the ILI, supra note 21; Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield
Goes to Delhi, supra note 21.
31. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 186–188.
32.
Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi, supra note 21, at 481–82; Upendra Baxi, Notes
Towards a Socially Relevant Legal Education, 5 J.B. COUNCIL INDIA, 1975–1976, at 1, 20 (1976).
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published examination of the founding of the national law schools notes the impact of
Baxi and elite members of the bar and judiciary:
Justice M. Hidayatullah spearheaded the concept of a Law School on the
lines of Harvard Law School, which would be led by a diverse and dedicated
group of faculty and law scholars, would be autonomous in nature,
completely self-financed, not take any financial aid from Government or
regulatory bodies and in turn not permit their interference. The vision of
Justice Hidayatullah was discussed in a number of LEC meetings. Prof.
Upendra Baxi, eminent jurist who was [sic] co-opted member of LEC
undertook the spadework and the entire legal education scenario of the
country was set to undergo a metamorphosis.33
The aspiration was to create an Indian version of Harvard.
After a set of events well documented by Krishnan,34 N.R. Madhava Menon, a
protégé of Justice Krishna Iyer, one of the leaders of public interest litigation on the
Indian Supreme Court, established the National Law School of India University
(“NSLIU”), the first national law school (“NLS”), located in Bangalore. 35 Since that
time he has been one of the key promoters of legal education reform. Menon has
written an autobiography of his experience as a founder. 36
The five-year curriculum, Menon noted, was inspired largely by US law schools
and was much more rigorous than the three-year BA of the existing law faculties. The
school also had very limited resources when it opened in 1987, but the Ford
Foundation, which had long hoped to upgrade legal education and scholarship in
India, stepped in with an $800,000 grant “at a crucial time when the law school was
finding it difficult to continue operations (i.e.1989-1994).”37 The fortuitous timing of
the NLSIU helped ensure its success but turned it away from the initial mandate to
create a new generation of advocates aligned with public interest litigation. The first
graduates emerged just after economic liberalization, and they instead eagerly
embraced the new opportunities in the corporate law firms.
An international team, including Marc Galanter, William Twining, and Savitri
Gunasekhere from Colombo, reviewed the achievements of NLSIU and concluded
that it had “fully met the objectives of being a centre of excellence that serves as a
pace setter for Indian legal education.”38 The success of NLSIU then inspired the
national law school in Hyderabad (officially the National Academy of Legal Studies
and Research (“NALSAR”)), which opened in 1998, and then the model really took
off. There are now some twenty-one national law schools spread throughout India—
with varying claims to affinity with the original model. The national law schools have
33.
Justice N.N. Mathur, National Law Universities, Original Intent & Real Founders, LIVE LAW
(July 24, 2017, 7:58 P.M.), http://www.livelaw.in/national-law-universities-original-intent-real
-founders/ (emphasis omitted).
34. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi, supra note 21, at 484–88.
35. N.R. MADHAVA MENON, TURNING POINT: THE STORY OF A LAW TEACHER (2009).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 52.
38. Id. at 54.
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also influenced legal education outside of the NLS sector. The number of three-year
LLB programs is diminishing, with relatively few prominent hold outs such as Delhi
University and the Government Law College in Mumbai. Recently, for example, the
Pravin Gandhi School of Law affiliated with the University of Mumbai has switched
its emphasis to a five-year LLB program away from a three-year evening program.
Entrepreneurial opportunities toward increasingly influential US expertise were
further enhanced by the restructuring of the Indian economy, especially under Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, bringing the end of the Indian “Licensing Raj” and
opening up the economy to much more foreign trade and investment. This set of
economic reforms opened space for new and expanded Indian solicitors firms and for
global corporate law firms serving India from outside the country. Law firms retooled
quite dramatically in relation to the transformation of the economy.39 Many graduates
of the national law schools moved into these firms, and students there reportedly
compete now for slots within the national and global corporate law firms.40 As Jay
Krishnan noted in 2013, the law firm growth is relatively recent, reflecting the impact
of the dramatic economic changes.41 Of the forty top firms named in a survey, eight
started between 1991 and 1999, and fifteen began after 2000.42 To a certain extent, in
fact, the bar complains now about the relative lack of interest among the national law
school graduates in careers in the bar. 43
The first point is that the national law schools occupy a relatively tiny niche
within Indian legal education. We are not, therefore, examining the vast majority of
law faculties and law graduates. There are some 1.3 million lawyers in India, more than
1,200 law schools and faculties of law, and perhaps 45,000 law students. There are
roughly 30,000 applications for the 1,500 to 2,000 positions in the national law
schools.44 The Common Law Admission Test, established in 2008, allows students to
take one examination while applying to national law schools throughout the country.
The process is similar in this respect to the Indian institutes of technology.
The standardized tests used by the national law schools require English
proficiency, and the fees of about $2,500 per year deter a great number of applications
as well. A recent study of students at NLSIU confirms that they come
disproportionately from high incomes and high castes. 45 Brahmins made up 26.5
percent of students and other upper castes 32.5 percent, with the numbers likely

39.
Ashish Nanda et al., Mapping India’s Corporate Law Firm Sector, in THE INDIAN LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 69.
40. Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27.
41.
Jayath Krishnan, Peel-Off Lawyers: Legal Professionals in India’s Corporate Law Firm Sector, 9
SOCIO-LEGAL REVIEW 1, 24 n.76 (2013) (explaining that the legal services sector expanded because
of economic liberalization).
42. Id. at 20.
43. Interview No. 15, in India (Jan. 2017).
44. See Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27.
45. CHIRAYU JAIN ET AL., THE ELUSIVE ISLAND OF EXCELLENCE: A STUDY ON STUDENT
DEMOGRAPHICS, ACCESSIBILITY AND INCLUSIVITY AT NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL 2015–16, at 28, 32
(2016).
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higher if they included those who did not report.46 Some 30 percent of NLSIU
students come from Tier 1 (major) cities, but that is a decline from 50 percent,
suggesting a more provincial trend although not away from urban settings. Most
students have parents that are fluent in English. 47 There are also a small number of
students in the “reserved” group for “scheduled castes” and similar groups. The report
suggests that those with more advantage do better in school, participate heavily in the
moot court competitions, and get prestigious jobs upon graduation. 48 As others have
suggested, it is very difficult to come from outside the elites and excel in law school in
India. 49 Shamnad Basheer’s creative and tenacious efforts to expand the chances for
outsiders to gain success in the national law schools illustrate the tremendous obstacles
they face.50
Parallel to the Indian institutes of technology, the caste elites are not
distinguished especially by wealth or property, but by an ability to embody the
accepted meritocratic values. As a scholar of the IITs suggests, “they are able to
inhabit a universal worldview precisely because of a history of accumulated privilege, a
history that allows them a unique claim to certain forms of self-fashioning.”51
“Whereas at an earlier moment, status might have been more explicitly tied to caste,
the social bases of merit continue to be constituted in ways that allow the same social
groups to inhabit merit as an embodied ideal.” 52 They are selected because of their
achievement—which tends to coincide with caste.
The legal press in India reports on the high prestige positions that graduates
obtain from the national law schools. Recently the NALSAR in Hyderabad reported as
follows. Out of seventy-four graduating students, the fifty-eight who participated in
the campus recruiting program all got positions. Those positions included ten Shardul
Amarchand Mangaldas, six Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, five Luthra & Luthra, four
Trilegal, three AZB & Partners, two Khaitan & Co, two P&C Legal, and two S&R
Associates, with a few other firms hiring one. On the in-house side, the RPG Group
hired five, while ICICI Bank hired four students. Others reportedly planned to
“pursue careers in academia, policy making, judicial and civil services, et cetera.” They
reported offers to attend “the University of California at Berkeley . . ., the participating
universities for the European Masters in Law and Economics program, the Faculty of
Law, Oxford University, and Faculty of Law, Cambridge University, University of
California at Los Angeles, Cornell University, and the London School of
Economics.”53 Some planned on taking civil service exams, and was one taking a

46. Id. at 28.
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id. at 14–15.
49.
Shamnad Basheer et al., The Making of Legal Elites and the IDIA of Justice, in THE INDIAN
LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 578.
50. Id.
51.
Ajantha Subramanian, Making Merit: The Indian Institutes of Technology and the Social Life of
Caste, 57 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 291, 296 (2015).
52. Id.
53.
B. Varun Reddy, NALSAR Class of 2017: Conclusion of Recruitment Process, SCC ONLINE
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judicial exam. Two reportedly were planning on becoming advocates or clerking for a
court. Similar results came from the other law schools reporting in the media,
including Bangalore and Gujarat NLU. 54 A dean of a more traditional law school
noted that the law firms preferred to hire from the national law schools than from the
traditional schools.55
These data are somewhat misleading, however. First, many leave the law firms
after a relatively short time. One observer stated that half of the graduates of national
law schools leave the practice of law within ten years for other careers such as
business, design, and journalism.56 An examination of the LinkedIn members
identified with the national law schools in Hyderabad and Bangalore, which seems to
capture a good portion of the alumni, suggests that many are still in law firms but quite
a number are in business, in-house, legal education, or alternative careers. NLSIU has
5,441 alumni listed, which no doubt includes those who have participated in a range of
programs, but it is interesting that the breakdown includes many or even most in
careers other than legal careers.57 Clearly a large group is not in legal careers. 58 Of the
legal component, the largest employers listed are the leading corporate law firms and
the bar. The list shows a number at the top law firms and in the bar, but the numbers
in relation to the number of graduates is not high. Krishnan’s research on the
frequency generally of individuals leaving corporate law firms—“peeling off” also
suggests that graduates are not in general making their careers in the large corporate
law firms.59
As Krishnan notes, lawyers leave in part because the leading corporate law firms
generally are of two types: family-dominated or dominated by a few individuals.
Interviews confirmed this situation today, suggesting that there are very few “true
partnerships.”60 One young lawyer in a law firm with his father in Mumbai notes that
family-operated businesses often feel comfortable giving their legal work to the
children of a longstanding lawyer. 61 The new firms started by many of those who leave
tend then to replicate the structures they left behind. 62 Starting salaries are also
relatively low. A small firm might pay 40,000 Indian rupees per month, a large one
50,000, and a few firms such as the two Amarchand firms pay some 150,000 rupees a
month, producing annual salaries of $7,500 to less than $30,000 (often augmented to
some extent with bonuses).

BLOG (May 2, 2017), http://blog.scconline.com/post/2017/05/02/nalsar-class-of-2017-conclusion
-of-recruitment-process/.
54. See generally Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27.
55. Interview No. 2, in India (Jan. 2017).
56. Interview No. 3, in India (Jan. 2017).
57. Nat’l Law Sch. of India Univ., LINKEDIN (last visited Nov. 17, 2017), https://www
.linkedin.com/school/15092875/.
58. Id.
59. Krishnan, supra note 41, at 31–32.
60. See id.; see also Interview No. 4, in India (Jan. 2017).
61. Interview No. 5, in India (Jan. 2017).
62. Krishnan, supra note 41, at 8, 54–56.
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Many who leave the law firms also seek to gain a foothold at the bar by teaming
up with an established advocate. Krishna shows how difficult it is to make it that way
and break into the hierarchical advocacy world. 63 One of the frequent observations
about the graduates of the national law schools is that, after almost thirty years of
producing lawyers, no graduate has become a grand advocate or a judge.64 The
meritocratic criteria of the national law schools do not so far overcome the strong
familial capital required for a career at the bar, which then can lead to judicial
appointments. Indeed, as discussed below, advocates promoting their sophisticated
expertise can be seen as “too modern for the court” or “incapable of playing by rules”
because lacking inside knowledge of the rules.65
The world of the bench and bar also has a very strong impact on both the law
firms and the national law schools, which are embedded deeply in the world of elite
advocacy and the judiciary. The law firms can be divided into three general categories.
The first is what Legally India terms the “Big Seven.”66 The big seven law firms gained
prominence or were established after economic liberalization. They include Cyril
Amarchand Mangaldas, with 601 lawyers; Khaitan and Co., with 485; Shardul
Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., with 430; AZB & Partners, with 375; Luthra & Luthra,
with 336; J.Sagar Associates, with 302; and Trilegal, with 221. They are the most
important corporate law firms. Another group is the older firms established by
expatriates in the colonial era, such as Crawford Bayley, established in 1830. Other
firms in this category include Little & Co., and Mulla & Mulla. 67 These were the most
prominent firms prior to liberalization, but they did not move to adapt to the new
situation, and a very few partners dominated the firm and the profits. They were
eclipsed by the newer and more entrepreneurial firms, which also attracted more new
associates because of the promise —ultimately not realized—that firms would be
more egalitarian in sharing the profits and partnership places. The remainder of the
corporate legal sector is comprised of many small firms serving some aspect of the
corporate business. Still, the current “big seven” has a “quasi monopoly” on major
transactions.68
For all the law firms, it is necessary to have access to the leading advocates in
order to be successful for clients in litigation. One of the larger firms reported the
importance of access to the “face value” of the fifteen or so advocates that they
utilized.69 Nanda, Wilkins, and Fong note that the older firms survive in part because
they are so connected with the elite bar. Their niche generally is the places where “oldline connections and prestige remain salient . . . for big Indian companies”—in

63. Id. at 38, 56–57.
64. Interview No. 6, in India (Jan. 2017).
65. Interview No. 7 (Email) (July 2017).
66. A Ranking of India’s 25 Largest Law Firms, LEGALLYINDIA.COM (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:59 P.M.),
http://www.legallyindia.com/law-firms/india-25-largest-law-firms-by-headcount-00011130-8166.
67. Nanda et al., supra note 39, at 72–75.
68. Wilkins & Khanna, supra note 23, at 144.
69. Interview No. 8, in India (Jan. 2017).
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particular, real estate and regulatory.70 Furthermore, “[t]hese firms also have longstanding relationships with many of India’s top grand advocates and high court
judges”—“when the matter is really sensitive and the CEO needs someone he can
really trust to navigate the bureaucracy or the courts . . . .”71
There are other ways that the law firms connect to the networks around the
bench and bar. Two of the most prominent of the big seven law firms, each of which
has very prominent women in key positions, illustrate familial embeddedness. Pallavi
Shroff, a key partner in the Delhi firm of Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., is the
wife of Shardul Shroff, the chair of the firm and inheritor with his brother of his
father’s prominent firm. She is also the daughter of well-known retired Supreme Court
Justice P.N. Bhagwati, one of the justices also most identified with public interest
litigation. The Shroffs also link closely to the Gujarati community and Reliance, one of
the major corporate groups.72 Khaitan and Co. similarly is closely connected to the
Marwari community from Kolkata and Aditya Birla Group. 73 Further, Zia Mody, the
founder of AZB and partners, is the daughter of Soli Sorabjee, another famous Indian
jurist and former attorney general of India. Mody started the firm after ten years as an
advocate. Reportedly she became tired of the male-dominated bar and took advantage
of her University of Cambridge law degree, Harvard LLM, and family capital to start
what has become one of the most successful law firms in India.
The law firm sector has grown substantially since economic liberalization, but it
does not appear to be growing very much today. After an initial expansion of the
corporate legal services market under liberalization, the market appears to have
stagnated—perhaps in part because of the limited local opportunities and products
offered in litigation.74 The corporate law firms in varying degrees are linked up with
the familial world of the elite bench and bar, even though, as we suggest below, a
number of those in the corporate bar are also pressing for some change.
The connection between the elite bench and bar to the national law schools is
extremely close. The governing boards of the national law schools are dominated by
members of the elite of the bar and the judiciary. More generally, legal education is
regulated by the Bar Council—the organ of the advocates. The Bar Council, for
example, prescribes twenty-six mandatory courses, limits teaching by practitioners, and
limits class size to sixty.75 It also imposed an all-India bar examination in 2010.
Leaders of the relatively marginal All India Law Teachers’ Organization argue that the
Bar Council should have “no role” in the teaching program of the law schools, but
there is no likelihood of change.76 The Bar Council is still in charge.
The hierarchical connection between the judiciary and the national law schools is

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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76.

Nanda et al., supra note 39, at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 78.
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Id.; see also Interview No. 9, in India (Jan. 2017).
Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27.
Interview No. 10, in India (Jan. 2017).
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even stronger. Key judges generally decide whom to hire as the dean or vice chancellor
of a national law school. One vice chancellor spoke of meeting a key judge for dinner
and then getting offered the position.77 According to one knowledgeable observer,
potential deans “cow-tow to the local judiciary,” forming a “small cabal.” 78 The
chancellor of each school is a judge, with the chief justice of the Indian Supreme
Court the chancellor of the NLSIU by virtue of the chief justice position. One critic of
the NLS vice chancellors, in fact, stated that once they are appointed, they spend all
their time and energy trying to gain stature within the world of the elite bench and
bar. 79 The dependence of each NLS on the vice chancellor’s clout magnifies the
importance of those ties. Faculties have very weak voices so that the schools are
“personality driven” by the vice chancellor.80 Interviewees noted that when a capable
vice chancellor left the NLS Kolkata, for example, the school went back to the “dark
ages.”81
The influence of the judiciary is quite pronounced. The ability to get local
government funding, according to interviews, depends on the work of members of the
judiciary who lobby their local government—which must pay some attention since
they appear frequently before those judges. It is also quite clear that the funding levels
for most of the national law schools are not very high, which puts pressure on them to
increase tuition fees. Finally, the more recently established NLS tend to have
substantial local restrictions placed on them (e.g., number of students that must be
local). Recently, legislation that would reserve 50 percent of the NLSIU spots for
locals has alarmed alumni. 82
Very high teaching loads are the norm in the NLS with the major exception
currently of the NLS Delhi, which is very well funded and focused under the current
vice chancellor on significantly increasing the research output. More generally, the
spread of the national law schools has not substantially raised the prestige and profile
of legal academics in India. Many interviewees noted that there is still no real career in
legal academia. One law graduate in a different PhD program noted that there is no
real job as “law professor.” It is a “dead end.” 83 The NLS phenomenon, others noted,
did not change the faculty model of professors as just “teachers.” The “main focus is
teaching” at the national law schools, even though the teaching itself is not that high
quality.84 There is “not much time for research,” and there are no “structures to build
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up” to promote a better position for faculty members.85 There is little focus on the
“quality of faculty” or “research agendas.”86 The faculty of the national law schools
from our observations tends to be relatively young and many faculty members do not
stay in teaching. The group includes many who did not succeed in litigation and a
number who are not on the “tenure track.”87
The longstanding effort to upgrade law teaching and legal scholarly research,
supported by a number of Ford Foundation initiatives beginning in the 1950s, has so
far had limited success.88 The best and brightest law graduates do not seek careers as
law professors. There is a recognition among many we interviewed that more legal
academics are producing research, and the number of academic scholars today is much
greater than in the past. But interviewees also report that the journals are “dead” and
that the advances are quite limited.89 While many people in India can name judges or
senior advocates, legal scholars, with the exception of Upendra Baxi, are unknown
even in the legal profession.90 The national law schools, moreover, are the relatively
elite tip of the iceberg. There are more than a thousand other public and private
schools with lower pay—including a large number of private schools that pay half of
what the public schools pay.91 Only the private Jindal Global Law School near Delhi
(“Jindal”), discussed below, and the well-funded national law school in Delhi appear to
have a commitment to encourage scholarly productivity.
The pressure to change comes mainly from those who go abroad. Many who go
become part of a brain drain, but a group of relatively young lawyers with elite
credentials suggests that more are returning. As noted by one interviewee,
“increasingly people are coming back,” the legal academy is more “exciting” than in
the past, and many see “teaching as a vehicle” for research. 92 They hope for a
“recapturing and reinvesting of the brain drain.” 93 What they learned abroad and is
valued abroad, however, is still unevenly recognized or even devalued in India. 94 We
examine these groups below after the discussion of the bar.
THE BAR
The tightly-connected elite of the bench and bar remains at the top of the legal

85. Interview No. 14, supra note 80.
86. Interview No. 16, in India (Jan. 2017).
87. Swethaa Ballakrishnen, Where Did We Come From? Where Do We Go? An Enquiry into the
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www.fordfound.org/about-us/a-legacy-of-social-justice/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
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hierarchy. It is dominated especially by well-connected elites, including Brahmins and
upper castes and the Parsi elite in Mumbai.95 The grand advocates are at the top of the
hierarchy. Galanter and Robinson point out that seniority is part of this relationship. 96
Since judges face compulsory retirement at sixty-one (and at sixty-five in the supreme
court), they are often younger than the senior advocates and may have looked up to or
even learned their practices from them. As noted above, the elite of the bar and bench
have a very strong impact on legal education, on the governance of the national law
schools, on the hiring of the vice chancellors who govern the schools, on the funding
of the schools, and also in providing social capital that helps make up the elite of the
corporate law firms.
The bar has participated in initiatives such as the national law schools and public
interest litigation that have enhanced the legitimacy of the profession and opened up
to more meritocratic and high-quality entrants. But it is still a legal elite that is
essentially inbred and very restrictive in entry. As noted above, the graduates of the
national law schools have not had much success in this sector of the legal profession.
The conservative nature of the bar is quite evident. The attitude toward the law
professors is apparently much like it was traditionally in the UK. The professors are
not highly respected. One interviewee noted that professors at one NLS sought to
eliminate Saturday classes in part to encourage research, and the governing board
rejected the request because, in their opinion, “law professors don’t work anyway.” 97
One interviewee noted that there is a “large disconnect between academics and
practice,” and the feeling of superiority is mutual.98 The narrowness of the prevailing
view of law practice is captured by a lawyer in a social science PhD program who had
trouble renewing the license to belong to the bar. The authority thought that
interdisciplinary academic study about law was inconsistent with the position of
member of the bar. 99
The issue of the quality of the advocacy came up in a number of interviews. 100
From the side of the law firms, as noted above, the interviewees reported the need for
the “face value” of the fifteen or so advocates that they use, but the interviewees also
say that the abilities of the elite bar are “lower and lower.” 101 The problem, in part, is
that the elite advocates have too many cases. They also do not use technology in their
arguments. They rely on “court craft” and “no depth.”102 A former law firm lawyer
suggested a “blinkered vision of law,” that there are very few quality lawyers in the bar,
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that the bar is “mediocre,” and that “80 percent were unprepared.”103 Interestingly, a
number also of the in-house counsel studied by Wilkins and Khanna reported “great
frustration with the quality of these top advocates.”104
Well trained lawyers armed with the experience of Oxford, Cambridge, or US
law schools, coupled with experience in an international law firm, find that they are
“overtrained” for litigation in India. 105 The senior advocates do not have time for
complex points, and it is by no means clear that, if they did, the judges would embrace
them. There is no “market for top level legal argument,” in the words of a senior
partner in a law firm. 106 Arbitration to avoid the courts is no answer, according to the
same partner, because judgments must be enforced in the courts.107 One young lawyer
reported that he left the practice of law because of this disconnect between what he
was trained for and what he could use in litigation in India.
Interviewees stated that there were some prominent exceptions among the
bench and the bar. Most frequently named were two justices of the Supreme Court
from prominent legal families. One is Justice Dhananjaya Yashwant Chandrachud,
whose father Shri Y.V. Chandrachud was the longest serving chief justice of India.
Chandrachud graduated in economics and mathematics from St. Stephen’s College in
New Delhi in 1979, obtained his LLB degree from Delhi University in 1982, and
obtained an LLM degree from Harvard University in 1983. The other is Justice
Rohinnton Fali Nariman. Nariman is the son of Fali Sam Nariman, a leading senior
advocate. The younger Nariman received his early education in Mumbai, with a
B.Com. degree from Shri Ram College of Commerce. He completed his LLB from the
Faculty of Law, University of Delhi and then obtained an LLM from Harvard Law
School. He practiced law in New York for a year as well. His career in India went fast,
mixing family capital and meritocratic credentials. The bar had to amend the rules to
allow him to become a senior advocate at the age of thirty-seven. He reportedly is the
first Harvard alumnus to serve as a justice at the Supreme Court of India.
Family capital remains vital for careers in the bar and on the bench. The system
for promotion into the judiciary is secret and subject to some criticism. Selection to
the high courts and to the supreme court takes place through a closed colloquium and,
as one observer noted, it results in enduring legal names that tend to be upper caste:
from Mumbai, as the example of Nariman suggests, among the Parsi elite.108 The
impact of selection to a high court or supreme court, in addition, endures beyond
retirement, since retired judges gain many influential positions related to politics and
the law after their service on the judiciary.109
103. Interview No. 18, supra note 90.
104. Wilkins & Khanna, supra note 23, at 146.
105. Interview No. 18, supra note 90. For a similar phenomenon experienced by Indians with
LLMs from the US, see Ballakrishnen, supra note 87.
106. Interview No. 3, supra note 56.
107. Id.
108. Interview No. 12, supra note 79.
109. For example, Nick Robinson shows that, “In about half of Indian states, including Bihar
and Madhya Pradesh, there are public ombudsmen called lokayuktas, i.e., ‘People’s Commissioners’ in
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Interestingly, in a recent speech to the bar association in Mumbai, Justice
Chandrachud raised some judicious criticisms about the closed nature of the bar. 110
After praising the bar as an “assembly line of brilliance,” he talked of “our outmoded
way of working” and the “perception that the bar is closed.” He lamented the talented
individuals who “never went to the supreme court,” and argued that it is “an issue of
grave concern” that there is “talent” with “no access to centers of power.” He stated
that it was important to “open up our bar to a true meritocracy.”
The national law schools, as noted, have not provided an effective meritocratic
pipeline into the elite bar. One leading lawyer with a family firm in Mumbai noted that
for the leading lawyers in Mumbai, whether practicing in firms or as advocates, the
likely choice of law schools would be the Government Law College (“GLC”),111 and
the same would be true for New Delhi with the University of Delhi law faculty.112 The
reasons are twofold: the exam threshold is difficult to pass for admission to an NLS;
and the networks around the GLC are essential to success in Mumbai.
Admission to the GLC is not easy. Many are turned down. Yet several locals
within the elite legal world noted that children of judges and elite advocates get in
despite lacking the top credentials. One graduate noted that if one has “no
connections,” it will be very difficult to find the mentors at the bar necessary for
success;113 on the other hand, a faculty member says that the GLC students without
connections have the time and capacity to find them. 114 No one disputes the value of
family capital in careers starting at the GLC. Similarly, neither graduates nor faculty
argue that there is any real teaching at the GLC. Classes meet from 7:30 a.m. to 10:30
a.m., and busy practitioners may not show up to teach if something else comes up.
There is in any event “no need to attend classes.”115 The students essentially spend all
their time apprenticing with the advocates who congregate at the Bombay High Court
one block from the GLC. There are conscientious professors nevertheless who help,
for example, to organize a law review, but scholarly capital pales in importance to
family capital. Interestingly, however, one faculty member reported that there were
currently three GLC students at Harvard. 116 One administrator noted that leading US
schools recruit at the GLC, and that as many as 25 percent study abroad—despite the
lack of academic rigor at the GLC.117 The social capital suffices.
The portrait of the bar reveals a legal elite that is very inbred and restricted in
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Hon. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Address at the Sesquicentenary Event of the Bombay
Bar Association (Nov. 19, 2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIy02Wrbt0E.
111. Interview No. 20, in India (Jan. 2017).
112. Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27.
113. Interview No. 12, supra note 79.
114. Interview No. 21, in India (Jan. 2017).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Interview No. 22, in India (Jan. 2017).

2018]

Battles Around Legal Education Reform

161

entry. There is no way to mix the legal milieu. The graduates of the national law
schools, who treat their law degrees similar to the engineering graduates of the Indian
institutes of technology, have to find another path of meritocracy versus a small subset
of a national elites around the courts and advocacy. Further, with the growth of trade,
corporations, and investment, there are opportunities for a professional class to serve
the state, and big corporations, with new and more “modern” expertise. The law
firms, as noted, which rebuilt their approach after the era of conveyancing and some
banking relationships, are one place where some of this upgrading has taken place, but
they are limited by the world of a very conservative elite bench and bar. These
challengers likely circumscribe the possibilities for the grand advocates, keep them out
of some new markets, and therefore limit the opportunities for new advocates to gain
entry to the rarified levels now dominated by very senior advocates. Those senior
advocates are still necessary for access to the higher courts, but much energy is now
spent looking for ways around this path.
CHALLENGES TO THE ELITE BENCH AND BAR
The challenges and pressures for change tend to come from the outside. As
noted, at least one of the top supreme court justices, with multiple degrees from
abroad, has sought to modernize from within. But the highly-internationalized elite are
the more general source of the change. It includes many who have studied abroad,
including individuals with Rhodes Scholarships, and a number who have returned
from the United States or from positions in the English “magic circle” law firms or
variants in Australia. A good proportion has advanced degrees from the United
Kingdom, but the United States has become more attractive for study abroad in recent
years.118 The voices of these relatively young elites are evident in the litany of
criticisms in the preceding section. As noted, a number of graduates of the NLS have
teaching and research positions abroad. They, too, participate in these debates. It is
indicative that a recent review article of law and social science research about India
emphasizes the work of those who are from India, but work abroad.119 Within India,
in addition, there are now clear alliances of this internationalized group with business
and philanthropy promoting a modernized “good governance” within India.
The leading internationalized law firms within India are part of the offensive.
One top litigation partner with experience abroad noted the impact of the bar’s
narrowness. The partner argued that in transactional work the leading law firms could
grow and take advantage of foreign clients and their own local and transnational
expertise.120 But in litigation they were still blocked; they could not deploy their
expertise or their abilities to draw on technological innovations. This mismatch also
limits the growth of the Indian legal market. Some firms are trying to build their own
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in-house litigation expertise to work with, or go around, the advocates, but the
possibilities of bypassing are still pretty limited.
As noted above, the earlier offensive to upgrade legal knowledge, combined with
social activism, was not very successful despite the efforts of the Ford Foundation. 121
The new offensive goes with, and gained momentum with, the economic liberalization
that began in 1991. The professional milieu around finance and business associated
with liberalization can take advantage of the mix of social capital and corporate
connections, but any move into law has been blocked by the insular legal profession.
This problem is evident from the relatively limited career opportunities even for the
graduates of the national law schools, who tend to come from the social group with
resources, but not family legal capital. The “global meritocratic” quality of the top
graduates is indicated by the high number of NLS graduates who obtain Rhodes
Scholarships.
There is a new, legally-educated elite, therefore, and it has its own hierarchies
and trappings linked to the national law schools. But to jump anywhere past the
limited extensions that this new elite status can offer (i.e. firms, global organizations,
think tanks, some in-house positions), or to jump into the mainstream legal elite,
requires different forms of capital. The law graduates from the national law schools
have profiles similar in this respect to the graduates of the Indian institutes of
technology,122 but they do not have the opportunity in India to mix engineering, social
science, technology and law in the way that it is done in the Silicon Valley, for
example.
One potential remedy for the economic liberals is to open up the legal services
markets, but the Bar has strongly opposed competition from abroad within India. 123
There is more momentum now than in the past for a limited opening, but there are
still “snags.” The opening would undoubtedly have an impact, perhaps in two ways.
On the one hand, it may weaken the power of the Indian corporate law firms, since
the global law firms have advantages facilitating large scale transactions. As suggested
by Wilkins and Khanna, “foreign firms were more likely to handle important matters
involving M&A, civil liability, and arbitration.” 124 The global firms may also attract
more Indian nationals back to India because of the relative openness of those firms
for advancement.125 At the same time, as Nanda, Wilkins and Fong point out, the
traditional firms founded in the colonial era by British lawyers “might actually be seen
as more valuable” if the market is opened up because of their unique ties with
regulatory authorities, the grand advocates, and the courts.126

121. See Krishnan, From the ALI to the ILI, supra note 21; Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to
Delhi, supra note 21.
122. Subramanian, supra note 51.
123. Aebra Coe, Plans to Open Up Legal Sector in India Hit a Snag, LAW360, (Oct. 4, 2016, 7:25
P.M.), https://www.law360.com/articles/848269/plans-to-open-up-legal-sector-in-india-hit-a-snag.
124. Wilkins & Khanna, supra note 23, at 147.
125. Nanda et al., supra note 39, at 106.
126. Id. at 109.

2018]

Battles Around Legal Education Reform

163

Many of those who go abroad become interested in research and teaching, and
they increase some of the pressure within India. Many stay abroad. There are at least
six individuals teaching in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. 127
As noted before, a number of them nevertheless want to “recapture and reinvest the
brain drain.”128 They overinvest in technical scholarly sophistication in part because of
the challenge they face in India to break into the world dominated by the bar. Not
surprisingly, they often aim their research precisely at the quality of the courts and the
judiciary, seeking transparency as a way also to challenge the conservatism. As already
noted, they have not succeeded in breaking down the walls. Scholarly research at the
national law schools is very limited, including at the top ones, and the position of law
professor is still not widely respected, and does not offer an attractive career path.
There is also some upgrading in faculty credentials by emulating the British
requirement for a PhD to teach at the national law schools.
Nevertheless, there are some very prominent examples of research successes,
such as the research at the NLS Delhi on the death penalty, which also provide some
transparency while drawing on empirical legal research approaches imported from the
United States. Anup Surendranath, the law professor in charge of the project, is a
graduate of NALSAR in Hyderabad with an Oxford PhD gained through scholarship
assistance. His death penalty research led the chief justice of the Indian Supreme
Court in 2014 to name him the deputy registrar (research) in the Supreme Court of
India. According to his website, “The only other instance of an academic being invited
to the supreme court for a similar assignment was almost thirty years ago, in the late
1980s, under Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati.”129
Other examples are think tanks created by individuals returning from abroad and
well aware of the limited opportunities to deploy their knowledge and expertise. Vidhi
represents a particularly notable example.130 According to its website,
The Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy is an independent think tank doing legal
research and assisting government in making better laws. Vidhi is committed
to producing legal research of the highest standard with the aim of informing
public debate and contributing to improved governance. Vidhi works with
Ministries of the Government of India and State Governments, as well as
other public institutions, providing research and drafting support at various
stages of law-making.131
Vidhi also conducts independent research, including: “Judicial Reform: Research
in this area takes a data-driven approach to suggesting reforms that address the
problem of judicial delays.”132
127. Interview No. 23 ( (Email) (July 2017).
128. Interview No. 19, supra note 92.
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More than thirty professionals working with Vidhi are listed on the website. The
research director and founder is Arghya Sengupta, a graduate of the NLSIU and
Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. His PhD at Oxford was on the independence
and accountability of the Indian higher judiciary. The credentials of the group are
stellar, with degrees from the national law schools, US, British, and other graduate
programs, and experience which includes work with the corporate law firms.
The genesis of the group was among graduate students in Oxford, who noted
the “inadequate legal research” that formed the basis of the government’s work on an
Indian-US nuclear deal. 133 The group included two from Oxford, one from Harvard,
and one from Delhi, and they believed that the there was a “gap in the system.”134 The
government had high quality input on economics and policy, but not good law. This
group acted to remedy the problem for the nuclear agreement, and they were
successful in gaining credibility and attention despite their very young ages. They
decided to build on this work and create a think tank to occupy the space of high
quality legal research. They observed that there was no perceived problem in
government litigation, in any event under the control of the bar, but the quality of
legal expertise generally needed upgrading. They used their capital from their studies
abroad and the Rhodes Scholarship, even though only in their early twenties, to find
independent funding. They were successful, and began in 2013 as the “first legal think
tank.” They were also very careful to avoid “advocacy” or other activities that could
taint the “expertise.”135
Suggesting some appetite for an upgrade in legal expertise as part of good
governance, they succeeded in raising money not from the legal profession but from
philanthropy, including substantial support from Rohini Nilekani, part of the Infosys
community. Vidhi does not pay high salaries, but tries to pay roughly half of what the
associates in law firms make. They work with other disciplines and other think tanks,
with some circulation among such think tanks as the Center for Policy Research in
New Delhi. There are also links to the national law schools and to the Jindal Global
Law School. They belong to the group challenging the traditional, and conservative,
world of the bench and bar.
The Jindal Global Law School is the first high profile private law school in India
and also the first to focus specifically on academic scholarship. 136 It is the brainchild of
Raj Kumar, a representative of the diaspora reinvesting in India. He has degrees from,
among other places, Delhi, Oxford (where he went as a Rhodes Scholar), Harvard, and
the University of Hong Kong. In 2009 he became the founding vice chancellor of the
Jindal Global Law School. Kumar was teaching at the University of Hong Kong, and
became convinced that the national law schools had not succeeded in bringing Indian
legal education as far as necessary. In particular, he believed that research was not
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sufficiently emphasized. Drawing on US capital and US institutions for initial support,
and drawing on the success of the private Indian School of Business, he went
searching for philanthropy to build a $100 million private law school. He succeeded,
ultimately, with the Jindal grant, drawing on wealth generated from the Jindal steel
empire. Still, tuition had to be set quite high according to Indian standards. It is now
equal to about $10,000 per year. The school offers a five-year LLB/BA, a three-year
LLB, and a one-year LLM.
After beginning with a law school, Jindal Global University now has a business
school, a liberal arts and humanities school, a communications and journalism school,
and a school of international affairs. Jindal this way seeks to build interdisciplinary
connections around law that are missing from the traditional faculties of law and the
national law schools. Jindal has numerous relationships with schools abroad, and the
faculty includes a number of expatriates. Notably, some one-third of the faculty
members are graduates of one of the national law schools. Faculty salaries are
relatively high for India, and there are centers focused on research. The teaching loads
are not light, and the scholarly output is a little uneven, but the professors are wellintegrated into the global and, especially, US scholarly worlds. 137
A third area challenging the traditional legal knowledge comes not from within
the various law schools, but rather in the social science departments, especially at the
prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (“JNU”). There is the Law and
Social Sciences Research Network (“LASSnet”), organized by the Centre for the Study
of Law and Governance at JNU, which has held a number of conferences. It draws on
and challenges legal scholarly capital in several ways. The key individual organizing this
network is Pratiksha Baxi, a sociologist at the Centre and the daughter of Upendra
Baxi. This interdisciplinary work offers an option that law graduates may pursue to
avoid the narrowness of legal scholarship and the precariousness of the law professor
position.
This terrain of expertise challenging the conservatism of the elites of the bench
and bar is mainly a detour around Indian hierarchies. It builds on foreign capital—
especially from the United Kingdom and the United States—to push beyond the
conservatism. This terrain provides some outlet for the hundreds, or even thousands,
of individuals who receive good educations yet are locked out of the very conservative,
and embattled, bar elite. These efforts have not touched the elite of the bar in a
substantial way to date, but the aging elite of the bar faces a threat that may render
their enduring conservatism and bunker mentality obsolete.
The challenge to the traditional bar, it should be noted, should not be portrayed
as a meritocracy versus inherited legal positions. The challengers themselves have
substantial resources from within current Indian society and from abroad. Jindal is
funded by a large business, and it often takes business-generated wealth to attend. It
takes resources to do well on the tests for admission to the national law schools and to
build study abroad on NLS degrees. The think tanks, in particular Vidhi, also connect
137.
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to major businesses seeking to upgrade the quality of governance in India, including
law. It took connections to that wealth and cosmopolitan capital—Oxford and
Harvard degrees—to gain entry to those groups and build Vidhi. These approaches
allow law graduates to branch out and to challenge and perhaps surround the
traditional elite, but they represent a palace war mainly among elites.
Compared to the QCs in England who are embedded in oligarchy, politics, and
the business class, with entry into the knowledge world of Oxford and Cambridge, the
senior advocates in India appear narrow and embattled. They do not enrich and renew
their knowledge, which appears to be decades behind the United States and the United
Kingdom. Contrary to the relatively optimistic conclusion of Galanter and Robinson
about the status of the grand advocates today, 138 that status is hardly the same as
when, for example, the Parsi in Mumbai and the Brahmins in Madras were central to
economic and social life on the path to independence. The bar made a comeback
through the reaction to the emergency and the creation of public interest law, but the
same individuals who gained credibility at that moment dominate the elite of the bar
today.
The elite grand advocates, high court, and supreme court judges face challenges from
those more attuned to the globally ascendant expertise and set of technologies. 139 But
the embattled elite remain able to assert their influence over many of the ostensible
challengers within legal education and within the solicitors’ firms. The challengers are
more meritocratic and less dependent on family capital, and they therefore provide a
counter movement to the traditionally closed legal profession of India. But the
challengers, as noted, do not represent the graduates of the more than 1,000 law
schools that now exist in India. They represent a counter elite, with professional and
business parents, high caste backgrounds, and resources that allow them to excel on
the exams necessary to attend the national law schools or Jindal, pay the tuition, and
gain the international capital necessary to mount challenges to the embedded local
hierarchies.
CONCLUSION
Legal education reform in India is closely associated with the legal revolution
linked to U.S.-style globalization, financialization, and the growth of private markets.
The rise of national law schools and the Jindal Global Law School are part of that
revolution, which involves more meritocratic entrance into the profession, upgraded
legal instruction and faculty credentials, upgraded advocacy, and internationalized and
interdisciplinary scholarship. The rise operates in tandem with the rise of corporate
law firms linked to the new law schools. As elsewhere, this more meritocratic course,
coupled with a great expansion in access to the legal profession, exacerbates inequality
on the basis of access to such education, upbringing and linguistic skills essential to
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gain entry into one of the top faculties of law and to elite careers, especially in the
corporate law firms. The various magic circles of the legal elite are open to only a very
few with privileged backgrounds.
The revolution also meets some strong resistance, largely connected to the
embattled elite in India built on family capital and entrenched in the elite judiciary and
bar. The resistance of these elites helps prevent the development of academic careers,
sustained legal and interdisciplinary scholarship, quality teaching, and the higher
quality of legal argument and advocacy that a relatively young and internationalized
legal elite seeks to effectuate. With many paths blocked for the young elite, we see
them using their international capital, and connections to business and philanthropy,
to build think tanks, a few pockets of interdisciplinary research, and high quality
faculty in the national law schools, the internationally oriented Jindal Global Law
School, and in networks in the social sciences. They represent a strong Indian
challenge to the elite bench and bar, but not so strong at this point that the elite bar’s
monopolistic returns are threatened.

